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In the following pages the reader will find the first part of a collection of 
essays devoted to themes from the thought of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), 
mainly focused on his masterpiece, The Methods of Ethics (1874).1 The work 
of Henry Sidgwick has had certainly a peculiar fate in the philosophical 
debate of the twentieth century. As lamented by Bart Schultz in the 
Foreword to his classic collection Essays on Henry Sidgwick, published in the 
early nineties, the attention paid to Sidgwick’s work is not comparable to 
the attention received by the great British thinkers of the past. We still do 
not have critical editions of his work, nor do we have many volumes 
dedicated to him (there are relatively few indeed if compared to the studies 
available on Hobbes, Hume or Mill). Finally, at least at the time when 
Schultz was writing, Sidgwick’s books, with the exception of the Methods of 
Ethics and the Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, were 
unobtainable.2 
It is interesting to note however that in spite of the scant attention 
received in academia,3 Sidgwick greatly influenced some of the most 
important moral and political philosophers of the twentieth century. 
Philosophers like George Edward Moore, John Rawls and Derek Parfit all 
acknowledged their debt to him, so that it would not be an exaggeration to 
claim that Sidgwick played a formative role in setting the agenda and the 
methodology of our current discussions on metaethics and normative ethics. 
                                                 
1 A second group of contributions will follow in the next issue of Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics. 
2 Schultz 1992. 
3 One of the reasons usually produced to explain the scant attention received by Sidgwick is his writing 
style, which most people seem to find pedantic and rather dull (see Broad 1930, pp. 143-144; Selby-Bigge 
1890, p. 93). For a different opinion see Blanshard 1984, p. 21; Rashdall 1885, p. 200. 
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This view seems to be confirmed by two other prominent figures in the 
contemporary debate in moral and political philosophy, David Gauthier 
and Stephen Toulmin, both of whom argued that Sidgwick, rather than 
Moore, can be considered the real father of contemporary moral philosophy, 
since it is in The Methods of Ethics that the distinction between normative 
questions and questions about the meaning and the nature of judgments 
(which marks the beginning of contemporary metaethics) was explicitly 
defended for the first time.4 
This however is not the only reason why Sidgwick can be said to have 
created “the prototype of the modern treatment of moral philosophy;”5 or, 
in Rawls’ famous words, “the first truly academic work in moral theory, 
modern in both method and spirit”.6 Sidgwick is arguably the first 
philosopher who treats ethics as an autonomous area of investigation, not 
depending for its conclusions on the acceptance of a particular metaphysical 
system. In the Methods of Ethics he starts instead with the ordinary beliefs 
of individuals belonging to a specific place and time, and then proceeds by 
way of a reflective dialogue between these beliefs and some of the most 
important ethical principles advanced in the history of moral philosophy. 
The idea underlying this approach is that moral principles can only be 
founded in the reflective worldviews of the agents who have to recognize 
and endorse them.7 
Nussbaum correctly traces back this approach to Aristotle,8 which is 
certainly a plausible interpretation, since Sidgwick himself presents his work 
as an attempt to “imitate” Aristotle’s examination of “the Common Sense 
Morality of Greece, reduced to consistency by careful comparison: given not 
as something external to him but as what ‘we’ – he and others – think, 
ascertained by reflection”.9 However it is only with Sidgwick that it is 
clearly stated for the first time (at least in the modern era) that the only 
way to reach an adequate justification in ethics is by a systematic 
comparison between the different conceptions of morality and the different 
                                                 
4 See Gauthier 1970, p. 7; Toulmin 1986, pp. VII-XX, Hurka 2003. For a different view see Cremaschi 
2006. 
5 Schneewind 1977, p. 1. 
6 Rawls 1980, p. 341. 
7 It is controversial whether this approach can be said to anticipate Rawls’ method of “reflective 
equilibrium”. For a criticism of this view see Singer 1974. 
8 Nussbaum 1986, pp. 10 and 424, footnote 16.  
9 Sidgwick 1981, p. xxi. 
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methods that these conceptions presuppose. Hence Sidgwick’s attempt to 
reduce all possible moral theories to three fundamental models: egoism, 
intuitionism and utilitarianism. 
It should be noticed that in Sidgwick this idea is closely connected to 
another idea; namely the belief that all moral problems can be reduced to 
fundamental moral questions. Once they are so reduced, according to 
Sidgwick, moral theories will provide an answer to these problems. This 
view has been thoroughly criticized by the so-called anti-theorists,10 but is 
still widely shared by most moral philosophers working in the Anglo-
American tradition. 
These are all reasons that bolster Schneewind’s conclusion that 
“Sidgwick gave the problems of ethics the form in which they have 
dominated British and American moral  philosophy since his time”11, which 
is in turn echoed by Eugenio Lecaldano’s observation “that in the same way 
in which we can look at Adam Smith – with many simplifications – as the 
founder of scientific economics, we can look at Sidgwick’s work as the first 
attempt to provide a completely rational and scientific study of ethical 
conduct”.12  
To this we should add that The Methods of Ethics offers a series of 
insightful theses about the nature of moral judgments and moral concepts,13 
the concept of justice,14 the critique of moral naturalism and the analysis of 
hedonism (to name but a few). These theses will constitute a constant point 
of reference for the contemporary debate. The same is true for Sidgwick’s 
particular formulation of utilitarianism, which is widely acknowledged as 
the clearest and most sophisticated version of the classical doctrine,15 and is 
still one of the most influential in the current debate.16 
                                                 
10 See for example Williams 1985; Hampshire 1983 and 1989; Baier 1985; Taylor 1985; Larmore 1987. 
11 Schneewind 1977, p. 422. Some interesting remarks on the merits and defects of Sidgwick’s approach to 
ethics can be found in Rawls 1980, pp. 314-3; but see also Rawls 1981 and 1975. A study of the affinities 
and the differences between Sidgwick’s and Rawls’ approach is yet to be produced. For some interesting 
ideas about this comparison see Barry 1973, pp. 4-9;  M.G. Singer 1976; Schultz 1992, pp. 7, 39 and 49-51.  
12 Lecaldano 1996, p. 498. 
13 One of the aspects of Sidgwick’s thought which has received more attention is his moral epistemology, 
which combines a particular form of intuitionism with a sophisticated analysis of common sense morality. 
See Schneewind 1963; P. Singer 1974; Sverdlik 1985; Brink 1994; Daurio 1997; Pellegrino 2000; Crisp 2002. 
14 According to Herbert Hart, The Methods of Ethics (together with Perelman’s De la Justice) contains “the 
best modern elucidations of the idea of justice”; see Hart 1994, p. 299. 
15 See Rawls 1981. 
16 On the influence of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism on the theories of Richard M. Hare, David Brink, Philip 
Pettit and Peter Railton see Renzo 2008. 
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In light of these considerations it should come as no surprise that 
Sidgwick’s work has received more and more attention over the last twenty 
years. In 1996 a complete edition of his works, including two volumes of 
essays and reviews not previously collected, have been published by 
Thoemmes.17 In 1998 Sissela Bok published a new edition of Practical Ethics, 
drawing attention to the importance of Sidgwick’s contribution to this area 
of ethics.18 Bok’s volume was followed a couple of years later by another 
collection of Sidgwick’s essays, edited by Marcus G. Singer, which highlights 
the importance of Sidgwick’s contribution not only to ethical questions, but 
also to value theory in general, to moral psychology and to philosophical 
method.19 In 2000, for the centenary of Sidgwick’s death, Utilitas published 
a special issue on his work,20 while the British Academy organized a 
conference whose proceedings were published the following year in a volume 
edited by Ross Harrison.21 Finally, in 2006 Bart Schultz published a long-
awaited biography which offers an extremely detailed portrait of Sidgwick’s 
life and of his intellectual development, as well as of his political views.22 
Certainly this is not enough to give Sidgwick a position comparable to 
that of Hobbes, Hume or Mill in the Olympus of British moral philosophers. 
Yet the situation is clearly very different from the one described by Schultz 
in his Foreword, more than 15 years ago. Our intention in this issue is to 
contribute to this renaissance of Sidgwick studies by putting together a 
collection of articles that explores some of the most important aspects of his 
thought. The aim is to go beyond the mere rediscovery of a neglected author 
and to contribute to that mature stage of Sidgwickian scholarship, which 
will hopefully keep flourishing in the next decades. 
Mature scholarship has among its marks a focus on puzzling aspects, 
rather than a concern with completeness, so we left our authors free to 
concentrate on those aspects of Sidgwick’s thought which most interested 
them, without any constraint or theme assigned. In selecting the 
contributors to this collection however we have been guided by three main 
concerns. First, we wanted the collection to further our understanding of 
                                                 
17 Sidgwick 1996. 
18 Sidgwick 1998. 
19 Singer 2000. 
20 AA VV 2000. 
21 Harrison 2001. 
22 Schultz 2004. 
 
Guest Editors’s Preface 
 13
Sidgwick’s ethical thought (see the contributions of Robert Shaver and 
Anthony Skelton, two well-known Sidgwickian scholars). Second, we 
wanted to investigate the relationships between his thought and the 
philosophy of other key figures in the history of philosophy (see the pieces 
by Sergio Cremaschi, Massimo Reichlin and Alessio Vaccari). Finally, we 
wanted to show the relevance of Sidgwick’s ideas for some of the most 
important current debates in moral philosophy (see the pieces by Tim 
Mulgan and Francesco Orsi). Thus this collection aims not only to be a 
valuable source for those interested in Sidgwick’s scholarship, but also to 
offer a picture of the themes in Sidgwick’s philosophy that both 
contemporary philosophers and historians of philosophy find interesting 
and worth engaging with. 
Not surprisingly Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason confirms its role 
as one of the themes to which philosophers pay most attention. Francesco 
Orsi provides a critical survey of the many different readings of the dualism 
and argues in favour of a specific interpretation according to which 
Sidgwick’s puzzle is not only epistemic or logic, but also practical. Orsi 
offers an account of the dualism in which egoism and utilitarianism are 
logically compatible while remaining conflicting principles in terms of “all 
things considered” reasons. Tim Mulgan focuses on what Sidgwick 
considered as a possible solution to the dualism (though one he was 
skeptical about), namely postulating a divine moral order. Mulgan argues 
that, contrary to what Sidgwick thought, a non-dualistic morality does not 
require either absolute freedom of the will or believing in eternal survival. 
Accordingly, morality is less demanding than religion, and no religious 
premises are needed to overcome the dualism.  Finally, Alessio Vaccari 
describes how the origins of the problem can be found in the dualist ethical 
theory advocated by Joseph Butler. After comparing Butler’s treatment of 
prudence and morality to Sidgwick’s treatment of egoism and morality, 
Vaccari considers whether the dualism could be rejected by appealing to the 
views on personal identity and individual rationality that Derek Parfit 
famously defended in his Reasons and Persons (1984).23 
Among the merits of J.B. Schneewind’s seminal contribution to our 
understanding of Sidgwick is its attention to the intellectual context in 
                                                 
23 The comparison with Parfit’s most recent views is pursued to some extent in Orsi’s paper. Orsi critically 
assesses the reading of the dualism advanced by Parfit in his latest manuscript Climbing the Mountain. 
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which the Methods was written. By shedding light on many authors that 
Sidgwick discussed and referred to in his writings Schneewind greatly 
contributed to our understanding of the Methods of Ethics. The same kind of 
intellectual history is the focus of Massimo Reichlin and Sergio Cremaschi’s 
papers, which examine the complex relationship of Sidgwick’s thought to 
Kant and Whewell respectively. Massimo Reichlin draws an interesting 
picture of the complex web of references to Kant that can be found in 
Sidgwick’s writings. Sidgwick had a peculiar attitude toward Kant. While 
explicitly mentioning him as one of his main inspiration, he never paid 
enough detailed attention to Kant’s ethical thought. Reichlin examines 
some fundamental misunderstandings affecting Sidgwick’s (rather 
scattered) references to Kant’s ethical thought, and suggests that they 
might be due both to the influence of Mill’s dismissal of Kantianism and to 
Sidgwick’s rejection of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics. 
Unlike Kant, Whewell represented a recurrent presence in Sidgwick’s 
writings. However Sergio Cremaschi argues in his contribution that 
Sidgwick’s treatment of Whewell is more polemical than in-depth. Sidgwick 
took Whewellian intuitionism to be just an abstract and generic model of 
conservative common sense morality. He overlooked both the specific 
rationalist framework developed by Whewell in his Elements of Morality and 
the detailed solutions that Whewell’s texts offer to many particular moral 
dilemmas. Again, Sidgwick here seems to follow Mill in rejecting Whewell’s 
ethics more on political grounds than on the basis of a careful consideration 
of his arguments. 
Another much-debated topic in Sidgwickian scholarship is the kind of 
intuitionism defended in the Methods of Ethics. Notoriously Sidgwick 
grounded his justification of utilitarianism on a list of fundamental moral 
intuitions. Scholars however diverge about the number and the formulation 
of these intuitions.24 In his piece Anthony Skelton claims that Sidgwick’s 
utilitarianism is grounded in six fundamental intuitions and rejects rival 
interpretations, which generally tend to reduce the number of intuitions 
Sidgwick presented.25 Skelton then goes on to show how these intuitions 
play a role in a complex argument for utilitarianism, which dismisses both 
common sense morality and dogmatic intuitionism, while presenting a 
                                                 
24 See for example Rashdall 1907, pp. 90-91, 147, 184-185; McTaggart 1906; Schneewind 1977, pp. 290, 
296. 
25 With the only exception of Lacey 1959. 
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“Millian-style” proofs of utilitarianism, where Sidgwick attempts to 
convince critics of utilitarianism by reliance on views that they already 
accept. 
Today, the most pressing criticisms of utilitarianism come from virtue 
theorists. Sidgwick’s pages anticipated also this feature of our contemporary 
debates. In his contribution Robert Shaver shows that, in the context of his 
defense of hedonism, Sidgwick’s presented many different and 
interconnected arguments against the claim that virtue is a good (let alone 
the only good). This discussion appears in a chapter of the Methods (XIV of 
the book III) which Sidgwick revised many times through the various 
editions of his work.  Shaver starts by outlining Sidgwick’s main arguments 
and stressing the various puzzles they present. Then he argues that the best 
way to make sense of Sidgwick’s arguments is to view them in the context of 
a general claim that only desirable consciousness is intrinsically good. Thus 
Sidgwick’s argument against virtue theorists provides a way into his 
metaethical views of value. 
Collections like the one presented in the following pages depend in 
fundamental ways on the generosity of their contributors. Therefore as 
guest editors our gratitude is mainly to them. However special thanks are 
also owed to Pierpaolo Marrone and the editorial board of Etica & 
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